



Tolerable Risk— The Missing Link Between Risk Assessment and SIL Assignment

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- Mike Schmidt





Introduction

- Understand what SIL ratings are
- Understand “tolerable risk”
- Getting a sense of tolerable risk
- Establishing a risk matrix for SIL assignment

What are SILs?

- “SIL” stands for Safety Integrity Level
- SILs represent the difference between the process risk without a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) and the tolerable risk
- SILs apply to each SIF, not to the SIS as a whole
- SILs establish the required reliability of an SIF
- SILs are calculated to demonstrate that a SIF, as designed and operated, has the required reliability to maintain the tolerable risk

- Safety Integrity Levels

Safety Integrity Level	Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD _{AVG})	Risk Reduction Factor (RRF)
SIL 4	$10^{-4} > \text{PFD} > 10^{-5}$	$10000 < \text{RRF} < 100000$
SIL 3	$10^{-3} > \text{PFD} > 10^{-4}$	$1000 < \text{RRF} < 10000$
SIL 2	$10^{-2} > \text{PFD} > 10^{-3}$	$100 < \text{RRF} < 1000$
SIL 1	$10^{-1} > \text{PFD} > 10^{-2}$	$10 < \text{RRF} < 100$

- SIFs can also be N/R (not rated) for a SIL

Recommended approach: Risk Matrix

Likelihood	$f > \text{High}$	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3	SIL 4
	$\text{High} > f > 0.1 \text{ High}$	N/R	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3
	$f < 0.1 \text{ High (Low)}$	N/R	N/R	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2
		< 0.01 x Serious	> 0.01 x Serious	> 0.1 x Serious	> 1 x Serious	> 10 x Serious
		Consequence				

- The challenge is to define “x”, the serious consequence, and “High”, the high frequency
- After that, the categories themselves are separated by orders of magnitude

Many companies already have something similar for PHAs

Likelihood	1	5	4	3	2	1
	2	8	7	6	4	2
	3	9	8	7	6	3
	4	10	9	8	7	4
	5	10	10	9	8	5
		5	4	3	2	1
		Severity (Consequence)				



Some typical likelihood categories

- Categories—
 1. Frequent
 2. Occasional
 3. Seldom
 4. Remote
 5. Unlikely
- But what do they mean?



The categories are usually unevenly distributed

- Typical definition of Likelihood Categories—
 1. Event occurs once a year
 2. Event occurs once every 10 years (~1 order of magnitude)
 3. Event occurs once every 50 years (~ 1/2 order of magnitude)
 4. Event occurs once every 150 years (~ 1/2 order of magnitude)
 5. Not likely to occur (??? orders of magnitude)



Consequence categories are worse

- Severity (e.g. Consequence) –
 1. Loss of life; damage over \$1 million
 2. Lost time injury; damage over \$500k
 3. Medical treatment; damage less than \$500k
 4. Minor injury; near miss; poor quality
 5. No injury, impact on process



Converting an existing matrix

- Adjust likelihood categories so they are one order of magnitude apart
- Adjust consequence categories so they are one order of magnitude apart
- Assign SILs to each box



Building the Risk Matrix

Likelihood	1. Frequent					
	1 event / year					
	2. Occasional					
	1 event / 10 years					
	3. Seldom					
	1 event / 50 years					
	4. Remote					
	1 event / 150 years					
	5. Unlikely					
	5.	4.	3.	2.	1.	
	Consequence					



Adjust and consolidate

Likelihood	1. Frequent					
	1 event / 1.5 years					
	2. Occasional					
	1 event / 15 years					
	3/4. Seldom/Remote					
	1 event / 150 years					
5. Unlikely						
		5.	4.	3.	2.	1.
	Consequence					




Or reconsider entirely

Likelihood	1. Frequent					
	1 event / 5 years					
	2. Occasional					
	1 event / 50 years					
	3. Seldom/Remote					
	1 event / 500 years					
4. Unlikely						
		5.	4.	3.	2.	1.
	Consequence					

SIS and consequences

- Personnel consequences – The primary purpose of an SIS
- Community consequences – Can be another important purpose of an SIS
- Environmental consequences – Sometimes part of the purpose of an SIS
- Site and operability – Usually not appropriate to include in an SIS

The Accident Triangle





H.W. Heinrich's theory

- For 300 near misses, 29 first aids
- For 29 first aids, 1 serious injury or fatality

- Basis of the safety pyramid.

- Something like orders of magnitude

Heinrich, H.W., *Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach*, 4th Edition, McGraw-Hill (New York), 1959.



Cost of Occupational Injuries

- First aid \$292
- Temporary injury \$2782 (9.5x)
- Permanent partial \$15,342 (5.5x)
- Permanent total \$113,372 (7.4x)
- Fatality \$612,150 (5.4x)

Leigh, J.Paul, Steven Markowitz, Marianne Fahs, Philip Landrigan, *Cost of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses*, University of Michigan Press, 2000.



Cost of Accidents

- Reportable without lost work day \$7,000
- Reportable with lost work day \$28,000 (4x)
- Fatality \$910,000 (32.5x)

Mine Safety and Health Administration, “Cost of Accidents”,
<http://www.msha.gov/s&hinfo/costgenerator/costgenerator.htm>, 2006



From the literature

- Fatalities ~\$1,000,000
- Serious injuries ~\$100,000
- Injuries (reportables) ~\$10,000
- First aids (non-reportables) ~\$1,000



Relative cost of consequences

- Fatalities 1.0x
- Serious injuries 0.1x
- Injuries (reportables) 0.01x
- First aids (non-reportables) 0.001x



Aligns with some of the consequence categories

- Severity (e.g. Consequence) –
 1. Loss of life; damage over \$1 million ←
 2. Lost time injury; damage over \$500k
 3. Medical treatment; damage less than \$500k
 4. Minor injury; near miss; poor quality ←
 5. No injury, impact on process ←



The Risk Matrix

Likelihood	1. Frequent	5	4	3	2	1
	1 event / 1.5 years					
	2. Occasional	8	7	6	4	2
	1 event / 15 years					
	3/4. Seldom/Remote	9/10	8/9	7/8	6/7	3/4
	1 event / 150 years					
5. Unlikely	10	10	9	8	5	
	5.	4.	3.	2.	1.	
	< 0.1 injuries < 1 first aid < 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 injuries ≥ 1 first aid ≥ 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 disability ≥ 1 injuries ≥ 10 first aids	≥ 0.1 fatality ≥ 1 disability ≥ 10 injuries	≥ 1 fatality ≥ 10 disabilities	
Consequence (per event)						



What SIL goes in each box?


Likelihood	1. Frequent					
	1 event / 1.5 years					
	2. Occasional					
	1 event / 15 years					
	3/4. Seldom/Remote					
	1 event / 150 years					
	5. Unlikely					
		5.	4.	3.	2.	1.
		< 0.1 injuries < 1 first aid < 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 injuries ≥ 1 first aid ≥ 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 disability ≥ 1 injuries ≥ 10 first aids	≥ 0.1 fatality ≥ 1 disability ≥ 10 injuries	≥ 1 fatality ≥ 10 disabilities
		Consequence (per event)				




This depends on tolerable risk

- As an individual, what do you believe the tolerable risk should be for the facility?
- Take a moment to consider the mean time between fatalities that would be low enough to consider your facility **safe**.

ALARP – Levels Set per UK HSE




Government mandates



- The United States does not set tolerable risk levels, or offer guidelines.



Chemical industry benchmarks



- Large, multinational chemical companies tend to set levels consistent with international mandates
- Smaller companies tend to operate in wider ranges and implicitly, at higher levels of risk

Voluntary and “natural” risks—a comparison of fatality rates


- Smoking a pack a day—
5.0 x 10⁻³/year or 5000 fatalities per year per million smokers
- Automobile accident—
1.5 x 10⁻⁴/year or 150 fatalities per year per million people
- Lightning strike—
1.0 x 10⁻⁷/year or 1 fatality per 10 years per million people



Plant A – 1 fatality/100 years

- Assume that 1 fatality per 100 years is “safe”
- Exposed workforce ~ 250 workers
- $(1 \text{ year} / 250 \text{ man-years}) \times (1 \text{ fatality} / 100 \text{ years}) = 1 \text{ fatality} / 25000 \text{ man-years}$
 $= 4 \times 10^{-5} \text{ fatalities/man-year} = \text{total tolerable risk}$

ALARP – Levels Set per UK HSE





Process safety is only part of risk

Process safety is only part of the total tolerable risk

- Total tolerable risk = 4×10^{-5} fatalities/man-year
- Assume process safety risk is half = 2×10^{-5} fatalities/man-year



Tolerable risk per safety function

Process safety risk should not be allocated all to a single hazard

- Process safety risk = 2×10^{-5} fatalities/man-year
- Assume workers are each exposed to about 5 potentially fatal hazards
 - $N/R \leq 4 \times 10^{-6}$ fatalities/man-year
 - SIL 1 $\leq 4 \times 10^{-5}$ fatalities/man-year
 - SIL 2 $\leq 4 \times 10^{-4}$ fatalities/man-year
 - SIL 3 $\leq 4 \times 10^{-3}$ fatalities/man-year
 - SIL 4 or re-design $> 4 \times 10^{-3}$ fatalities/man-year



Putting a stake in the ground

Likelihood	1. Frequent					
	1 event / 1.5 years					
	2. Occasional					
	1 event / 15 years					
	3/4. Seldom/Remote					
	1 event / 150 years					
5. Unlikely						
		5.	4.	3.	2.	1.
		< 0.1 injuries < 1 first aid < 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 injuries ≥ 1 first aid ≥ 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 disability ≥ 1 injuries ≥ 10 first aids	≥ 0.1 fatality ≥ 1 disability ≥ 10 injuries	≥ 1 fatality ≥ 10 disabilities
Consequence (per event)						



The middle of the box

- 4.7 years is the log mean of the box
- 0.32 fatalities per event is the log mean of the box
- $(1 \text{ event}/4.7 \text{ year}) \times (0.32 \text{ fatalities per event}) \times (1 \text{ yr}/250 \text{ man-year})$
- $= 2.7 \times 10^{-4} \text{ fatalities/man-year}$
- SIL rating = SIL 2



The implied Risk Matrix

Likelihood	1. Frequent	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3	re-design
	1 event / 1.5 years					
	2. Occasional	N/R	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3
	1 event / 15 years					
	3/4. Seldom/Remote	N/R	N/R	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2
	1 event / 150 years					
5. Unlikely	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R	SIL 1
	5.	4.	3.	2.	1.	
	< 0.1 injuries < 1 first aid < 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 injuries ≥ 1 first aid ≥ 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 disability ≥ 1 injuries ≥ 10 first aids	≥ 0.1 fatality ≥ 1 disability ≥ 10 injuries	≥ 1 fatality ≥ 10 disabilities	
Consequence (per event)						



Reverting to the PHA matrix


Likelihood	1. Frequent	5	4	3	2	1
	1 event / 1.5 years					
	2. Occasional	8	7	6	4	2
	1 event / 15 years					
	3/4. Seldom/Remote	9/10	8/9	7/8	6/7	3/4
	1 event / 150 years					
5. Unlikely	10	10	9	8	5	
	5.	4.	3.	2.	1.	
	< 0.1 injuries < 1 first aid < 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 injuries ≥ 1 first aid ≥ 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 disability ≥ 1 injuries ≥ 10 first aids	≥ 0.1 fatality ≥ 1 disability ≥ 10 injuries	≥ 1 fatality ≥ 10 disabilities	
Consequence (per event)						

- 1 = re-design
- 2 = SIL 3
- 3 – 4 = SIL 2?
- 5 – 7 = SIL 1?
- 8 – 10 = N/R

or, recognize that the PHA priority matrix will not convert directly



Plant B – 1×10^{-6} fatality/man-year



Plant B – 1×10^{-6} fatality/man-yr

- Total tolerable risk = 1×10^{-6} fatality/man-year
- Process safety risk = 5×10^{-7} fatality/man-year
- Workers exposed to 5 potentially fatal hazards
 - N/R $\leq 1 \times 10^{-7}$ fatalities/man-year
 - SIL 1 $\leq 1 \times 10^{-6}$ fatalities/man-year
 - SIL 2 $\leq 1 \times 10^{-5}$ fatalities/man-year
 - SIL 3 $\leq 1 \times 10^{-4}$ fatalities/man-year
 - SIL 4 or re-design $> 1 \times 10^{-4}$ fatalities/man-year



The middle of the same box

- (1 event/4.7 year) x (0.32 fatalities per event)
x (1 yr/250 man-year)
- = 2.7×10^{-4} fatalities/man-year
- SIL rating = SIL 4 or re-design



The implied Risk Matrix

Likelihood	1. Frequent	SIL 2	SIL 3	re-design	re-design	re-design
	1 event / 1.5 years					
	2. Occasional	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3	re-design	re-design
	1 event / 15 years					
	3/4. Seldom/Remote	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3	re-design
	1 event / 150 years					
5. Unlikely	N/R	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3	
	5.	4.	3.	2.	1.	
	< 0.1 injuries < 1 first aid < 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 injuries ≥ 1 first aid ≥ 1 near miss	≥ 0.1 disability ≥ 1 injuries ≥ 10 first aids	≥ 0.1 fatality ≥ 1 disability ≥ 10 injuries	≥ 1 fatality ≥ 10 disabilities	
Consequence (per event)						

Variations to consider, depending on risk philosophy

Define SIL based on upper right corner, rather than the middle of the box. Most conservative approach, this increases SIL by one.

Likelihood	1. Frequent					
	1 event / 1.5 years					
	2. Occasional					
	1 event / 15 years					
	3/4. Seldom/Remote					
	1 event / 150 years					
	5. Unlikely					
		5. < 0.1 injuries < 1 first aid < 1 near miss	4. ≥ 0.1 injuries ≥ 1 first aid ≥ 1 near miss	3. ≥ 0.1 disability ≥ 1 injuries ≥ 10 first aids	2. ≥ 0.1 fatality ≥ 1 disability ≥ 10 injuries	1. ≥ 1 fatality ≥ 10 disabilities
		Consequence (per event)				



Fewer categories

A 5x5 matrix is probably the largest workable matrix. A 3x3 matrix is probably smallest workable matrix.

Likelihood	1. Likely	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3
	1 event / 15 years				
	2. Possible	N/R	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2
	1 event / 150 years				
	3. Unlikely	N/R	N/R	N/R	SIL 1
	4.	3.	2.	1.	
	< 0.1 disability < 1 injuries < 10 first aids	≥ 0.1 disability ≥ 1 injuries ≥ 10 first aids	≥ 0.1 fatality ≥ 1 disability ≥ 10 injuries	≥ 1 fatality ≥ 10 disabilities	
Consequence (per event)					



Adjust categories

While categories should be separated by orders of magnitude, the significant figure can be whatever is consistent with an organization's philosophy of risk.

Likelihood	1. Likely	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3	re-design
	1 event / 25 years				
	2. Possible	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2	SIL 3
	1 event / 250 years				
	3. Unlikely	N/R	N/R	SIL 1	SIL 2
	4.	3.	2.	1.	
	< 0.3 disability < 3 injuries < 30 first aids	≥ 0.3 disability ≥ 3 injuries ≥ 30 first aids	≥ 0.3 fatality ≥ 3 disability ≥ 30 injuries	≥ 3 fatality ≥ 30 disabilities	
Consequence (per event)					



Business Results Achieved

- A Risk Matrix for SIL assignment never explicitly states the tolerable risk.
- Likelihood and consequence only need order-of-magnitude estimates, reducing the extent of calculations required or the number of conflicting opinions that must be resolved, resulting in less cost to assign SILs.
- The Risk Matrix can be broadly applied and results in consistent treatment of hazards and risks, with much less under- or over-specification, resulting in lower total cost of safety instrumented system.



Summary

- SIL assignment is based on orders of magnitude
- A familiar risk matrix can be used to assign SILs, preferably with the likelihood and consequence categories are adjusted to orders of magnitude
- Tolerable risk is specific to an organization, and depends on its size and circumstances, government mandates, and industry standards
- Identical plants with identical risks will assign different SILs if their tolerable risk differs. There is no “Standard Risk Matrix”.

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2006



Questions?



Where To Get More Information

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